The expansion of offshore asylum processing has raised international concerns over human rights. Alessia Corti examines whether the 2024 Italy-Albania Migration Agreement breaches Italy’s international human rights obligations.
In February 2024, Italy and Albania agreed to transfer up to 36,000 asylum seekers yearly from Italy to two detention centres in Albania. Fully funded by the Italian government (Article 4 (5), Protocol Italy-Albania, Law n.14/24), these centres are seemingly designated for “fast-track asylum procedures”. Migrants deemed ineligible for asylum will remain detained in these Albanian centres until repatriation (Law n.14/24).
Offshoring processing allows Western states to shift
the responsibility for asylum seekers onto third countries, distancing
themselves from direct accountability and potential human rights violations. Outsourcing
asylum procedures can create legal and practical barriers that hinder asylum
seekers’ access to fair protections under international law.
The Italy-Albania agreement applies to migrants
rescued in international waters by the Italian Coast Guard and the Italian
Navy. Crucially, decisions
on eligibility for transfer to Albania are made on board the rescue ships. Only individuals
from countries
designated as “safe”, excluding vulnerable groups such as children and
pregnant women (though this exclusion is not explicitly stated), are sent to
Albania. Initially brought to a centre in Shengjin for asylum processing, those
denied asylum are transferred to another facility in Gjader to await
repatriation. Unlike the UK-Rwanda migration plan, these
Albanian centres operate under Italian law.
This agreement has sparked significant legal and
ethical concerns. Critics argue that conducting vulnerability assessments
aboard rescue vessels lacks fairness and humanity. Indeed, conducting
such evaluations in the middle of the sea means conducting them without the
necessary medical, psychological, and linguistic personnel to assess the
migrant’s circumstances comprehensively. For instance, doctors
are essential in addressing migrants’ health conditions or eventual
pregnancies, and psychologists are vital in determining whether migrants
suffered torture. Furthermore, conducting these assessments on board can
exacerbate the psychological stress of migrants, forcing them to stay longer
than required on the sea while facing life-altering interrogations in a
language they may not understand. The inadequacy of these on-board assessments
was demonstrated during the first implementation of the agreement in October
2024, when 16
migrants were transferred to Albania; however, 4 of them were quickly returned
to Italy after it emerged that some were minors and others had pressing medical
conditions.
In a report published in
January 2024, Amnesty International had already expressed the risks of
determining the “vulnerability” of the asylum seekers on the rescue boat. The organisation
emphasised the lack of resources and time required for accurate and fair
evaluations, noting that decisions made under such circumstances jeopardise migrants’ chances of
obtaining asylum.
Indeed, the test of vulnerability and the
determination of whether a migrant’s country of origin is “safe” have the
purpose of sending to Albania those whose asylum applications are expected, for
the majority, to be rejected. Amnesty also pointed out that international law
obliges states to minimise the time rescued migrants spend at sea and ensure
prompt disembarkation in a place of safety. Sending migrants to Albania—a journey of over 926 km — violates
this obligation and compounds
their trauma.
Let’s take a moment to consider the real-life
consequences of this agreement on those seeking asylum.
A migrant crosses the Mediterranean in a small,
overcrowded rubber boat, fleeing war, persecution, or extreme hardship. Under
the cover of night, the rubber boat capsizes. People fight to stay afloat,
gasping for air, as others succumb to the waves. Eventually, the Italian Coast
Guard rescues the survivors, offering a momentary sense of relief—but they
remain at sea. Many are in a state of shock, exhausted and traumatised, yet
they must immediately undergo questioning in a language they may not understand.
This happens without any legal aid, medical evaluation, or psychological
support. Their responses, given under extreme distress, determine their fate.
Some will be transferred to Albania—a country they may have no connection
to—where they face a fast-track asylum process, the haste of which comes from
the assumption that their application will be rejected.
Days at sea turn into weeks of detention, then months
of limbo. Those deemed ineligible face repatriation to the very dangers they
risked their lives to escape. Lacking empathy and violating international
obligations, this process erodes the migrants’ human dignity.
The agreement’s reliance on the
concept of “safe countries” has also been criticised. In October 2024, the Court of
Rome ordered the return of all migrants transferred to Albania, citing the “impossibility
of recognising as safe countries the countries of origin of the detained
persons”, namely Egypt and Bangladesh. The court referenced a
ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union. In response, the
Italian government issued a decree law (decreto
legge) listing 19 “safe” countries, including Egypt and Bangladesh. However, the question
remains: safe for whom? The 1951 Convention (Article
1 (2)) defines a refugee as someone with a well-founded fear of persecution.
This includes people targeted due to their membership to a particular social
group, such as LGBTQI+ individuals or women and girls risking genital
mutilation. For these individuals, countries described as safe by the Italian
government, such as Bangladesh
or Egypt, might not be safe at all. Returning asylum seekers to such places
violates the principle of non-refoulment (1951
Refugee Convention, Article 33 (1)) which prohibits sending individuals
to countries where they might face serious harm; and is a non-derogable norm, meaning
that non-refoulment
cannot be
suspended or ignored, even upon the consent of states.
Concerns about the migrant’s human rights extend
beyond the transfer process. Drawing parallels with the 2017 Italy-Libya
memorandum, human rights groups fear a risk of recurrence, in
the Albanian centres, of the human rights abuses happening in the centres in
Libya, which include torture
and inhumane living conditions. Although Albania’s centres are
governed by Italian law, oversight mechanisms and transparency remain limited,
raising concerns about the treatment of migrants after transfer.
While addressing migration challenges is complex,
policies must adhere to international law and prioritise humanity and fairness.
This agreement, as it stands, risks threatening the dignity and rights of asylum
seekers and undermines the very principles of asylum.
All articles posted on this blog give the views of the author(s), and not the position of the Department of Sociology, LSE Human Rights, nor of the London School of Economics and Political Science.
Image credit: Julie Ricard
